Child Care and Welfare Reform: The Wisconsin Experience
John C. Weicher
Hudson Institute
I. The Process of Reform in Wisconsin
1993: State law abolishing current system by 1999
1994-1995: New program designed by State Department of Health & Human Services and
Hudson Institute
1995, October: Governor sends program to legislature
1996, March: Legislature approves it - bipartisan support
1996, August: President endorses Wisconsin program
1997: State begins implementing program
NOTE: Wisconsin reform antedates federal legislation
II. The Program: "Wisconsin Works" (W-2)
* No assistance without working for it
Education & training count as work
* Four rungs on "Self-Sufficiency Ladder"
W-2 Transitions
education, training, counseling
Income: $628/month + Food Stamps
Community Service Jobs - public sector
30-hour work week
Job training to meet private sector requirements
Income: $673/month + Food Stamps
Trial Jobs - private sector
Employer receives wage subsidy
40-hour week
Income: at least minimum wage + Food Stamps & EITC
Unsubsidized Employment
Income: Market wage + EITC
* Time limits
24 month maximum per rung on lower 3 rungs
5 year maximum overall
III. Child Care in W-2
* Available to age 12, for working households as well as welfare
recipients
* Regulation
State regulation of all providers
Licensing for providers serving 4+ children
Certification for other providers
* Reimbursement
Rates set locally, by type of care & training
Certified care reimbursement rate is 75% of licensed care rate, for
trained providers, 50% for those without training
Expected statewide average cost: $4800/year for licensed, $3360 for
certified
* Funding levels
$180 million under W-2 vs. $80 million in 1996
$79 million from Federal/state child care programs
$81 million from TANF
$20 million from state
* Participation
190,000 children eligible
56,000 projected
19,000 actual, currently
70% in licensed care
17,000 participants before W-2
IV. Child Care Policy Issues
* Child care is the only element of W-2 to be revised after passage
* Copayment: should it be income-conditioned, price-conditioned, or
none at all?
* Effective marginal tax rates: does family's cost of child care rise
with income, and if so, how fast?
* Quality: should family have incentives to purchase less costly care,
or should high-quality care be provided for all children?
V. Resolving the issues: current policy
* Income eligibility limit set at 165% of poverty
Family already in program remains eligible as income rises to 200%
* Copayment primarily income-based
Rises by 10-15 cents per dollar of additional income
Varies by type of care (higher for licensed care)
Does not vary with cost of care, within type
Can be no more than 16% of gross income (with 2 children)
* "Cliff" at 200% of poverty
Family loses over $5,000 of child care subsidies (with 2 children)
Child care suddenly takes 40 percent of disposable income
Standard of living falls by 20%
Family's likely reaction:
cheaper child care?
no child care?
one parent stays home?
VI. Conclusion
Child care has been among the most politically controversial issues in
Wisconsin's welfare reform debate. The current outcome represents a balance among
competing views and interests. It is an improvement on the original legislation, which
phased out the state subsidy so rapidly that families between the poverty line and the
eligibility limit suffered a decline in disposable income when they received a raise in
wages. However, in the new version families face a sharp increase in child care cost and a
reduction in disposable income when they exceed the eligibility limit, at double the
poverty line.
In the immediate future, this will probably not affect many families
currently on welfare, but it may affect working families who become eligible for child
care as a result of W-2.
